Russia’s War Cost Poland PLN 490 Billion in Lost GDP, Statistics Poland Estimates

ECONOMYRussia’s War Cost Poland PLN 490 Billion in Lost GDP, Statistics Poland Estimates
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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine cost the Polish economy an estimated PLN 490.1 billion in lost GDP between 2022 and 2025, according to preliminary calculations by Statistics Poland (GUS). Households accounted for the largest part of the estimated loss — PLN 292.1 billion — while businesses lost PLN 126 billion and the general government and local government sector PLN 72 billion. The figures compare Poland’s actual economic performance with a counterfactual scenario in which the full-scale Russian invasion had not taken place.

The estimate was presented by Statistics Poland president Marek Cierpiał-Wolan during the Economic Forum in Karpacz. GUS stresses that the calculation is experimental and preliminary rather than a final bill for the war’s economic consequences.

This distinction is important. The PLN 490.1 billion figure is not the amount Poland directly spent because of the war, nor is it a formal compensation claim against Russia. It is an estimate of economic output that Poland could have generated in 2022–2025 under a no-war scenario.

Households absorbed almost 60% of the estimated loss

The largest part of the economic impact identified by GUS falls on households. Their estimated loss reached PLN 292.1 billion, equivalent to almost 60% of the overall PLN 490.1 billion figure.

Sector Estimated loss Share of total
Households PLN 292.1bn 59.6%
Businesses PLN 126.0bn 25.7%
General and local government PLN 72.0bn 14.7%
Total PLN 490.1bn 100%

One of the main transmission channels was inflation. Consumer prices in Poland rose sharply after Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. Average annual inflation reached 14.4% in 2022 and 11.4% in 2023 before falling to 3.6% in 2024 and 2025.

Nominal wages also rose quickly, but their purchasing power initially deteriorated. According to Cierpiał-Wolan, real wages fell by around 2% in 2022.

To estimate the impact on household savings, Statistics Poland adopted a conservative assumption that one-third of inflation above the central bank’s inflation target was attributable to the escalation of the war. On this basis, the loss of purchasing power of household savings was estimated at around PLN 70 billion.

That one-third share should not be treated as a directly observed measurement of the war’s contribution to inflation. It is a methodological assumption used in the experimental calculation. Price growth in 2022 and 2023 also reflected other factors, including energy and commodity prices, pandemic-era supply disruptions and domestic economic conditions.

Gross value added was PLN 426.5 billion lower

Statistics Poland also examined the effect on gross value added, a measure of the value generated by different parts of the economy. According to the preliminary estimates, gross value added in 2022–2025 was PLN 426.5 billion lower than it would have been in the scenario without the Russian invasion.

Construction was among the sectors most heavily affected. GUS estimated the gap in gross value added in the industry at PLN 120.9 billion, meaning construction alone accounted for more than 28% of the estimated shortfall in gross value added.

The effect was not uniform across the economy. Some activities benefited from higher public spending, defence procurement, refugee-related expenditure or changes in trade flows. The GUS estimate therefore does not simply add up sectors in which sales or production fell. It attempts to measure how the entire economy diverged from the path it might otherwise have followed.

Businesses account for PLN 126 billion of the gap

The business sector’s share of the estimated loss was PLN 126 billion, or just over one-quarter of the total.

Companies faced several simultaneous shocks after February 2022: sharp changes in energy and commodity prices, high inflation, higher financing costs and disruption to trade with eastern markets. At the same time, some companies gained from higher public procurement, defence spending and the reorientation of supply chains.

For that reason, the PLN 126 billion figure should not be interpreted as the sum of accounting losses reported by Polish companies. It represents the business sector’s estimated contribution to the difference between actual economic output and the counterfactual no-war scenario.

Poland spent an additional PLN 154.2 billion on defence

Statistics Poland separately calculated the increase in spending linked to the deterioration in the security environment. Additional national defence expenditure in 2022–2025 reached PLN 154.2 billion, according to the figures presented in Karpacz.

A further PLN 46.7 billion was spent from the Aid Fund established to finance measures related to people displaced from Ukraine after the Russian invasion.

These amounts should not simply be added to the PLN 490.1 billion lost-GDP estimate. The headline figure is already divided between households, businesses and the government sector. Defence expenditure, Aid Fund spending and the estimated PLN 70 billion loss in the purchasing power of savings describe specific channels through which the war affected Poland. Adding all of them together could result in double counting.

Higher defence spending also has an opportunity cost

The additional PLN 154.2 billion allocated to defence has a broader economic dimension. Defence spending does not disappear from the economy: it supports arms producers, suppliers, employees and infrastructure investment. Part of Poland’s procurement, however, is carried out abroad, and money directed to defence cannot simultaneously be used for other public or private purposes.

This opportunity cost is part of the broader economic impact of the war. In a less threatening geopolitical environment, some public resources could have been allocated to infrastructure, healthcare, education, energy investment or other priorities.

That does not mean increased defence spending is economically unnecessary. Following Russia’s invasion, security itself became a prerequisite for economic stability. The GUS work instead shows that the shift in national priorities carries a measurable economic cost.

PLN 490 billion is not a compensation invoice to Russia

The project may eventually have implications beyond economic statistics. Paweł Kowal, chairman of the Polish parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and the Council for Cooperation with Ukraine, said in Karpacz that the methodology had been discussed with experts from the United Nations.

The aim is to develop a method for assessing losses borne not only by a country that is directly attacked, but also by neighbouring economies that face indirect consequences of military aggression.

Work is also continuing on whether and under what legal framework such losses could potentially become the subject of future claims. A final version of the report is expected by the end of 2026.

At this stage, however, PLN 490.1 billion is not a legally recognised amount owed by Russia to Poland. It remains an economic estimate based on an experimental methodology.

How large is PLN 490.1 billion for the Polish economy?

For perspective, Poland’s nominal GDP in 2025 alone was estimated by Statistics Poland at PLN 3.9127 trillion. The four-year estimated loss of PLN 490.1 billion is therefore equivalent to roughly 12.5% of the value of GDP generated in 2025.

This comparison illustrates the scale of the estimate; it does not mean that Poland lost 12.5% of GDP in a single year. The PLN 490.1 billion figure covers four years and represents a cumulative gap between actual and hypothetical economic performance.

The calculation also ends in 2025. It therefore excludes the economic effects of the war occurring in 2026 and beyond.

Statistics Poland is trying to measure the economy that never happened

The most important element of the study may ultimately be its methodology rather than the headline number itself. GUS is attempting to answer a question that cannot be observed directly: how would Poland’s economy have developed if Russia had not launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022?

Such a scenario can only be modelled. This is why Statistics Poland describes the work as experimental and the Karpacz figures as preliminary.

If further work confirms the scale presented by GUS, the broader conclusion will extend well beyond the cost of supporting Ukraine or increasing defence expenditure. War affects neighbouring economies through investment, consumption, prices, wages, public finances, trade and corporate decisions at the same time. The Statistics Poland project is an attempt to bring those effects together in a single macroeconomic framework.

Sources

  • Statistics Poland (GUS), experimental estimates of the impact of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on the Polish economy, September 2026
  • Economic Forum in Karpacz, remarks by Marek Cierpiał-Wolan and Paweł Kowal, September 2026
  • Statistics Poland, consumer price data for 2022–2025
  • Statistics Poland, first estimate of Poland’s 2025 GDP, May 2026
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