Instead of asking how to increase the birth rate, we should be asking how to ensure that the state, the economy and public services can function efficiently under conditions of a lasting population decline.
Between 2024 and 2025, Poland’s population fell by 157,000 people, according to the latest data from Statistics Poland. That is roughly equivalent to losing the populations of Opole and Sopot within just 12 months. Demographic projections leave little room for doubt: year after year, Poland will have fewer inhabitants.
At the end of 2025, Poland had 37.3 million residents, whereas ten years ago the number was close to 38.5 million. This means that over the course of a decade the country’s population declined by more than 1.1 million people, or 3%. Demographic forecasts indicate that this downward trend will continue over the coming decades. According to projections by Statistics Poland, Poland’s population could fall to 28.4 million by 2060. United Nations projections are even more pessimistic, suggesting that by 2100 the country’s population may shrink to 19.4 million. The idea of a Poland of 40 million people can therefore be put aside as an unrealized ambition that will remain out of reach.
The main reason for the population decline is the record-low number of births. Last year, 238,000 children were born in Poland, around 14,000 fewer than in 2024. This trend is the consequence of a low fertility rate, that is, the average number of children per woman aged 15 to 49. In recent years, the process has been further intensified by the falling number of women of childbearing age, which is the result of smaller generations entering that stage of life.
According to Eurostat data, Poland’s total fertility rate stood at 1.14 in 2024. This means that, statistically, a Polish woman now gives birth to only one child over her lifetime. Within the European Union, a lower fertility rate was recorded in only three countries: Malta at 1.01, Spain at 1.10 and Lithuania at 1.11.
A fertility rate of 1.1 means an extremely rapid shrinking of the population because the generation of children is roughly half the size of the generation of parents. This leads to major shifts in the age structure of the population: the number of young people declines, while the share of older people increases. As a result, the ageing of society accelerates, further reinforced by rising life expectancy. At the same time, pressure on social protection systems increases, along with the risk of reduced access to public services. A smaller working-age population also directly affects the labour market, weakening both its potential and the economy’s productive capacity.
Only a fertility rate of 2.1 or higher allows generations to replace one another, keeping the population stable and easing demographic pressure on society and the labour market. Yet no European Union country currently reaches that threshold. Does that mean depopulation is a problem limited to the EU? Definitely not.
Although the fertility crisis is often associated with Europe, it affects most of the world. According to United Nations data, the global fertility rate stood at 2.25 in 2023. Africa was the only continent where it remained above the replacement level, reaching 4.07. In other parts of the world, the average ranged from 1.40 in Europe and 1.60 in North America to 1.64 in Australia, 1.71 in South America and 1.88 in Asia. UN projections show that the world’s population will continue to evolve gradually in the future. It is expected to rise to around 10.3 billion by 2084 and then begin to decline. By 2100, the global fertility rate is projected to fall to 1.84, with Africa declining to 2.02 and the rest of the world remaining below replacement level.
The data speak clearly: falling fertility is a global phenomenon observed across most regions of the world. This means we are dealing not with a temporary demographic crisis, but with a lasting structural change. The declining number of births, which leads to depopulation and, over the longer term, to a smaller number of women of childbearing age, is not only a problem for Poland or Europe. It is a process reshaping the population structure of the entire world.
In the modern world, falling fertility is primarily the result of social and cultural changes. More and more women prioritize financial stability, professional development and greater autonomy in private life. Having a large family is no longer the overriding goal it may once have been, and the decision to have children is made later and more often limited to one child.
Depopulation is not a neutral process. It is a serious challenge to the functioning of the state. A falling population affects key areas of socio-economic life: the labour market, public finances, healthcare, long-term care, education and the pension system. It also leads to the depopulation of villages and small towns and, as a consequence, to reduced access to public services for local residents.
Since the decline in fertility is a global phenomenon, a rapid reversal of this trend appears unlikely. That is why, instead of repeatedly asking how to increase the birth rate, we should increasingly focus on another, more fundamental question: how can we ensure that the state, the economy and public services function efficiently under conditions of a lasting decline in the number of people? The social and economic condition of Poland will depend on the answer to that question.
Author: Paweł Janukowicz is a doctor of social sciences in the discipline of economics and finance and a member of the Polish Economic Society.
