The battle for more than PLN 4.8 billion from the National Recovery Plan (KPO) under the “Support Instrument for the Low-Emission Economy” – a program aimed at developing electric vehicles – has attracted six companies. The funds are to be disbursed to beneficiaries by mid-2026, and one of the contenders is Electromobility Poland. Yet it turns out that after many years of activity, the company remains stuck in place, and its strategy is shifting in a worrying direction—towards supporting Chinese partners with ties to Russia…
According to information published by Puls Biznesu in July, the companies competing for KPO funds include:
ElectroMobility Poland (application for PLN 4.5 billion),WIKE (energy storage and RES projects), SES Hydrogen Energy FE (PLN 284 million for hydrogen hubs and electrolyzer production), Green Zone Energy Poland (PLN 246 million for RES projects), Green Bio Energy Systems (PLN 178 million for a cogeneration biogas plant), Adaptive Motors Poland (PLN 599 million for the “eVanPL” electric van factory in Kleszczów).
Electromobility Poland seeks the largest share of funding and has long presented itself as a company with a “mission to develop the future of new mobility in Poland.” But for how many years can one believe such assurances? —asks Tomasz Nowicki, author at Francuskie.pl (“Zamknijcie w cholerę to całe Electromobility Poland,” 16.11.2025). In EMP’s promotional materials, the slogan appears endlessly—as if repeating it often enough would magically produce a real factory, real cars, and a functioning business. Reality, however, is harsh: the road from slogans to industry is long, and EMP has not even stepped beyond the threshold, the expert warns.
The Illusion of a Grand Project and the Numbers That Hurt
EMP claims that at some unspecified point in the future “7,000 jobs will be created, including 5,000 in Silesia.” It sounds impressive—but bears little resemblance to reality. Poland’s automotive industry already employs more than 200,000 people in companies that produce actual goods: cars, engines, components, wiring harnesses, electronics, and parts for global manufacturers. The sector accounts for 8% of GDP and is one of the strongest pillars of Polish exports—built on production, not on glossy brochure promises, notes Francuskie.pl.
Against this backdrop, Electromobility Poland appears hardly credible. In seven years of existence, the initiative has produced little more than presentations, a single demonstration prototype, and streams of marketing slogans. The company insists that it is “developing projects connecting high technology with real market potential,” despite having neither projects, nor technology, nor a market. There is only a story that one day—if everything goes perfectly—something might be created. Meanwhile, public money continues to flow generously: taxpayers bear the costs, while future profits would flow to selected entities.
A Chinese Partner Instead of a Polish Brand. A 180-Degree Shift in Strategy
Observers were surprised by EMP’s sudden strategic pivot. In August 2025, EMP CEO Tomasz Kędzierski openly admitted that without KPO funding and the participation of a Chinese investor, the Jaworzno project would not materialize. The requested PLN 4.5 billion from the KPO was supposed to “work for Poland,” he claimed—though this comes with a radical shift in the concept: instead of the Polish Izera brand, EMP now envisions a European hub with strong Chinese investor participation.
As journalist Mirosław Domagała (Interia.pl) reports, in a lengthy LinkedIn post Kędzierski described how KPO money requested by EMP would benefit Poland—while simultaneously outlining a new vision for the company.
This shift—from a national car brand to a European hub with a new brand and substantial involvement from Chinese investors—may have shocked many industry watchers. The concept contradicts three core principles strongly promoted by the EU: supporting and strengthening European technologies, companies, brands, and workers, limiting the growing influence of Chinese automotive firms in Europe, legally restricting (via sanctions) Russian-linked business activity in Europe.
It must be emphasized that the primary objective of the KPO is to rebuild the economy after COVID-19 and strengthen the resilience and competitiveness of key economic sectors over the long term. The funds come from the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), part of NextGenerationEU. Poland receives them through a mix of grants and low-interest loans. One of the core expectations of the plan’s architects is supporting European competitiveness.
The United States is taking similar steps to limit Chinese influence. According to The Wall Street Journal, Tesla and its suppliers have already replaced some China-made components with parts produced in other countries and plan to eliminate all remaining China-made components within the next year or two.
Should Electromobility Poland therefore receive EU funds intended to create favorable conditions and EU market access guarantees for Chinese partners—according to EMP’s own public statements
Chinese partners with Russian ties
Unfortunately, EMP’s push to promote Chinese partners and support their expansion on the Polish market may have even broader implications. Automotive experts point out that many Chinese brands closely cooperate with, and are supported by, Russia. Chinese manufacturers are fond of Russian customers—and their rubbles.
Analyses of Chinese brands’ activity in Russia show that manufacturers from the PRC eagerly filled the void left by European companies following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the sanctions imposed in 2022 (Inovev.com). In 2022, nearly all global car manufacturers exited Russia—except the Chinese, many of whom rushed to occupy the market space left by Europeans and Japanese. The most active Chinese brands in Russia include Geely, Chery, Great Wall Motors, and JAC Motors.
Notably, Business Insider Polska reported on 16.10.2025 that China’s Geely was originally the technological partner for the Izera project, but cooperation ended in October 2025. EMP is now seeking new Chinese partners, with Chery and Li Auto mentioned as leading candidates (“Izera bez Geely i pieniędzy z KPO…”, 16.10.2025).
This raises an unavoidable question: Are we facing the risk of even deeper penetration of the Polish automotive market by Chinese—and indirectly Russian-friendly—interests?
Is it justified to support, with EU funds allocated to Poland through the KPO, companies seeking to promote Chinese partners closely linked to Russian business interests? The political and economic ties between China and Russia are well known—and openly described as a strategic partnership.
Experts argue that the European Union and the Polish government should thoroughly reassess this project.
