Love and Attachment to One’s Homeland Can Be Expressed in Different Ways, Each Involving Different Moral Criteria, According to Jagiellonian University Psychologists.
Psychologists from Jagiellonian University have found that love and attachment to one’s homeland can be expressed in various ways—and importantly, each is associated with different moral criteria. In their study, participants faced political dilemmas where group values conflicted with individual values. Differences among types of patriots may explain why misunderstandings and mutual accusations of betrayal or xenophobia are common.
“What people most often understand when they think of patriotism is attachment to their country, positive feelings toward it, and identification with their nation. We call this ‘conventional patriotism.’ However, love for the nation and homeland can also be understood and expressed differently—for example, through the belief that our group, nation, or country is superior to others, or through unconditional and uncritical support of one’s country. We term this ‘glorifying patriotism.’ Such individuals are likely to consider criticizing their country unpatriotic and disloyal. This mainly distinguishes them from the third form—‘constructive patriotism.’ Constructive patriots express love for their country through constructive criticism, recognizing problems and supporting positive change,” explains Maryna Kołeczek from the Institute of Psychology at Jagiellonian University, co-author of the study, in an interview with Newseria.
The researchers surveyed 1,062 participants via social media, measuring their patriotic attitudes. They then used Moral Foundations Theory to analyze the values underlying these attitudes. This theory identifies five moral foundations used to judge acts as good or bad: harm, fairness, loyalty, respect for authority, and purity. For instance, harm refers to whether an act causes pain or suffering; loyalty concerns faithfulness to one’s group, such as family or nation.
“Regarding the ‘respect for authority’ foundation, we consider whether someone behaved in a way that offends authorities—like leaders—or more metaphysical authorities. For example, breaking social rules or traditions might be judged negatively on this basis,” Kołeczek explains. “The last foundation, purity, concerns whether someone violated bodily, physical, or spiritual purity. An act might be seen as bad if it is unnatural or taboo. Many might find this foundation odd or irrelevant in moral judgments, which is interesting because Moral Foundations Theory suggests people differ in which foundations they consider important.”
The study showed that different types of patriotism align with different moral foundations, especially along individualist versus collectivist dimensions. Harm and fairness relate to individual-focused values, while loyalty, respect for authority, and purity relate to group-focused values. For example, glorifying patriots tend to prioritize obedience to national symbols and traditional purity values, paying less attention to harm or injustice. This was shown in a second study with over 1,000 participants facing political dilemmas pitting collective against individual values. One dilemma asked whether Poland should continue supporting refugees from Ukraine or the Middle East despite potential significant costs to citizens. Participants then completed the same patriotism measures as in the first study.
“Glorifying patriots mainly relied on group moral foundations, favoring their own group’s interests over outsiders and focusing on the group as a whole rather than individuals. Conventional patriots also cared more about the group than individuals but, when choosing between their own group and a needy outsider group, tended to help the latter. Constructive patriots showed no tendency to prioritize group over individual values,” notes Kołeczek.
The research highlights that all patriot groups understand right and wrong differently. Despite shared values, glorifying patriots might view constructive patriots as traitors for criticizing the country, while conventional patriots may see glorifying patriots as xenophobic or chauvinistic.
This may also explain other political and public conflicts.
“We will struggle to resolve these conflicts unless we understand that our attitudes toward very specific political issues stem from fundamental differences in worldviews. Arguing that a policy is good because it harms no one may fail if harm is not the only moral value important to opponents. Similarly, calling something disloyal may be ineffective if the other side doesn’t regard loyalty as a key moral category,” Kołeczek concludes.
